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Abstract 
 
Organizational innovations (OIs) such as scientific management, integration of mass 
production and mass distribution, and particular types of corporate governance played a 
preponderant role in the economic development of the USA during the period 1880s to 
1920s . To provide some further evidence of this role, historical data analyzed by Kuznets 
(1971) are scrutinized in this paper by calculating total factor productivity (TFP) for 
manufacturing sectors in the USA, and the impact of OIs on leading sectors is briefly 
explored in the light of these TFPs. Thus this paper provides quantitative evidence that 
leading sectors are linked with OIs during the examined period. In the light of this 
evidence the following proposition is made: leading sectors and OIs can be considered as a 
process of ‘embeddedness’ (Granovetter, 1985) for corporate strategy, governance, and 
leadership. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Organizational innovations (OIs)1 such as scientific management, integration of mass production 
and mass distribution, and particular types of corporate governance played a preponderant role in 
the economic development of the USA during the period 1880s to 1920s2. To provide some further 
evidence of this role, historical data analyzed by Kuznets (1971)3 are further scrutinized in this 
paper by calculating total factor productivity (TFP) for manufacturing sectors in the USA, and the 
impact of OIs on leading sectors is briefly explored in the light of these TFPs. Thus this paper 
provides quantitative evidence that leading sectors are linked with OIs during the examined period. 
In the light of this evidence the following proposition is made: leading sectors and OIs can be 
considered as a process of ‘embeddedness’ (Granovetter, 1985) for corporate strategy, governance, 
and leadership. This proposition can be deemed as an extension or a sub-theme of Chandler’s 
(1962, 1981) suggestion that there is a close interplay between strategies and organizational 
structures4. In other words, corporate strategy, governance and leadership can be operational only 
in the broader context of leading firms and sectors as well as their OIs5,6. In the first section the 
American manufacturing sectors will be examined, whereas in the second section the Japanese 
industries will be explored. 
 
1 USA 
Kuznets (1971) analyzed the structural changes of all industries in the USA in terms of shares in total 
output and growth for the period from 1880 to 1948. Chandler says in this respect: “...Kuznets’s data 
                                               
1 See Sanidas (2002a) for a historical review of OIs in the USA and Japan since the 1850s. 
2 For evidence on the impact of OIs on sectoral manufacturing growth in the USA in the most recent period 
after World War II see Sanidas (2001) and Sanidas (2002b). Similarly, for Japan see Sanidas (2002b).  
3 This author has analyzed sectoral data in order to indicate that technology,- not in the sense of OIs, but 
rather in the classical sense of technical innovations (TIs) or embodied technology (for example a new 
machine),- played a substantial role in the growth of key sectors.  
4 Chandler (1962) analyzed this interplay in a landmark study of 70 large corporations. In this respect see 
also Thompson and Strickland (2001, p. 363).        
5 Here, emphasis is on OIs, though TIs can also play a parallel strong role in this process of embeddedness.   
6 The process of embeddednes proposed here is also present in more recent periods such as that of after 
World War II (cf. the strategies and governance developed by Japanese firms within the context of Keiretsu 
and the just-in-time process, Keys et al, 1994). Presumably, other countries besides the USA and Japan have 
experienced the same process.   
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support the assertion that the industries spearheading American economic growth were those 
dominated by a small number of large managerial enterprises...” (Chandler, 1990, p. 226) In this 
section, the data used by Kuznets are more scrutinized in order to link sectoral growth with OIs. 
 
Two variables will be examined, namely the growth in the real output of manufacturing sectors, 
and the corresponding TFPs7. Although the data for this period are not as comprehensive as that of 
the last 50 years, available records from official American sources are used to construct these two 
variables on a 2-digit SIC equivalent sub-sector basis. The results can be deemed to be quite 
accurate for the purpose of this analysis, which is to detect differences in each one of the two 
variables (real output and TFP) between the sub-periods1899-1914, 1915-1929, and 1930-1937 
and relate these differences to various OIs. Unfortunately, no relevant data are available for the 
computation of TFPs before 1899. Table 1 summarizes the results analyzed in this section. In this 
Table, it can be seen that, although the rate of average annual growth in real output was almost as 
high during 1915 to 1929 as it was during 1899 to 1914, the TFP average annual growth was 
substantially much higher during 1915 to 19298. For the period 1930 to 1937, as might be 
expected, both real output and TFP declined equally because of the consequences of the Great 
Crash. In addition, sectoral growth in terms of real output and TFP can be grouped into several 
categories as shown in Table 2, thus differentiating leading sectors from non-key sectors. We can 
observe in this Table that manufacturing sectors, such as Transportation, and Machinery (both 
Electrical and other) led the American supremacy in industrial development especially during the 
second half of the Second Industrial Revolution (1915-1929).  
 
 
                                               
7 TFP is used according to the usual assumptions (see Jorgenson 1990, 1995) 
8 A pronounced slowdown of industrial productivity during the period 1890 to 1913 was also observed by 
David (1990, p. 356). 
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Table 1 Summary of sectoral productivity growth in the USA from 1899 to 
1937 
 
  Real Output Annual  % Real Number Empl/t  Real Output Annual  % Real Number Empl/t 
 Empl/t Output Deflator Aver/e Output Establ/s per Empl/t Output Deflator Aver/e Output Establ/s per 
 (000) (in 1929 $)  TFP(%) Growth Establ/s (000) (in 1929 $)  TFP(%) Growth Establ/s 
Food    growth     Tobacco  growth     
1899 476 6041 0.43   42000 11 140 472 0.56  14959 9 
1914 760 11050 1.48   51502 15 196 770 0.64 -0.12 4.21 13951 14 
1929 872 13730 1.00 1.60 3.03 55325 16 126 1284 1.00 0.20 4.45 1888 67 
1937 1049 16862 0.86 0.31 2.85 48763 22 98 1484 0.88 0.20 1.95 852 115 
                 
Textiles        Apparel       
1899 716 2076 0.50   5930 121 364 1203 0.52  12619 29 
1914 1013 3500 0.61 -0.15 4.57 6756 150 618 2289 0.60 0.07 6.02 18015 34 
1929 1190 6662 1.00 0.76 6.02 7415 160 681 3866 1.00 0.74 4.59 22470 30 
1937 1209 7231 0.73 0.81 1.07 6096 198 779 3055 0.98 -1.67 -2.62 16389 48 
                 
Wood         Furniture       
1899 602 2037 0.35   32456 19 111.2 1277 0.35  2614 43 
1914 718 1940 0.53 -1.26 -0.32 37949 19 169 985 0.74 -0.57 -1.52 4844 35 
1929 651 1583 1.00 0.22 -1.23 20928 31 248 1392 1.00 1.68 2.75 5491 45 
1937 473 1142 1.06 -2.58 -3.48 11747 40 225.4 1256 0.90 -0.39 -1.22 4469 50 
                 
Paper         Printing       
1899 100 332 0.60   1895 53 244 965 0.42  24363 10 
1914 182 794 0.65 -0.24 9.28 2344 78 406 1805 0.52 -0.06 5.80 34241 12 
1929 258 1761 1.00 1.31 8.12 2973 87 566 3122 1.00 0.63 4.86 27364 21 
1937 301 1834 1.03 0.21 0.52 3084 98 555 2871 0.94 -0.94 -1.00 22674 24 
                 
Chemicals        Petroleum       
1899 170 829 0.63   7669 22 31 173 0.72  308 101 
1914 269 1713 0.74 -0.28 7.11 10698 25 60 429 0.92 -0.04 9.87 591 102 
1929 382 4254 1.00 1.18 9.89 9327 41 133.8 4737 1.00 0.22 66.95 922 145 
1937 377 4911 0.89 0.79 1.93 8337 45 138.6 6150 0.85 -0.28 3.73 934 148 
                 
Rubber        Leather       
1899 39 37 2.70   301 130 265 1435 0.41  5785 46 
1914 89 174 1.73 1.75 24.68 342 260 341 1959 0.56 -0.10 2.43 6798 50 
1929 172 1102 1.00 2.61 35.56 525 328 351 1747 1.00 0.61 -0.72 4285 82 
1937 150 1089 1.01 -0.84 -0.15 578 260 362 1510 0.94 -0.45 -1.70 3249 111 
                 
Clay, Glass etc       Primary and fabricated metals    
1899 243 505 0.54   11571 21 591 2209 0.84  14949 40 
1914 405 1203 0.51 0.33 9.21 14793 27 1107 5362 0.66 0.05 9.52 25205 44 
1929 372 1655 1.00 1.18 2.50 8788 42 1549 10641 1.00 1.25 6.56 13785 112 
1937 331 1622 1.00 -0.09 -0.25 6114 54 1635 9895 0.98 -0.62 -0.47 11933 137 
                 
Non-electrical machinery      Electrical       
1899 456 1468 0.52   8995 51 49 190 0.49  592 83 
1914 774 2266 0.56 -0.35 3.62 15792 49 156 627 0.58 0.39 15.33 1048 149 
1929 769 4250 1.00 2.05 5.84 8529 90 421 1735 1.00 2.25 11.78 1861 226 
1937 795 4393 1.00 -0.18 0.42 7327 109 374 1801 0.91 0.69 0.48 1597 234 
                 
Transportation       Miscellaneous      
1899 70 312 0.54   3404 21 138 434 0.50  14123 10 
1914 331 1000 0.90 -0.21 14.70 4151 80 293 842 0.72 -0.11 6.27 21504 14 
1929 631 5365 1.00 2.04 29.10 2246 281 290 2334 1.00 1.68 11.81 12545 23 
1937 680 5894 0.91 -0.17 1.23 1958 347 288 1687 0.92 0.08 -3.47 10690 27 
                 
Total man/g                
1899 4850 21984 0.50   204754 24        
1914 7513 36434 0.64 -0.35 4.38 268436 28        
1929 9660 71220 1.00 0.94 6.37 206663 47        
1937 9786 74687 0.90 -0.16 0.61 166794 59        
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Sources: 
i) Creamer et al (1960) for the data of nominal output and real output (1929 prices) (Table 
A-10), and total capital stock in 1929 prices (Table A-8). 
ii) US Bureau of the Census (1975) for the data on number of employees, payroll, value 
added, and establishments (Series P 58-67). 
 
Notes:  
a. TFP, as estimated, includes as inputs the number of employees, materials or intermediate 
goods, and stock of capital.  
b. The output deflator used in the calculation of the TFP is derived from the series of nominal 
and real output. 
c. The materials series used in the calculation of the TFP is derived from the series of nominal 
output and value added. 
d. Some numbers for some years are only estimates; this does not affect the overall picture of 
Table 1. 
 
 
Table 2 Sectoral Growth in the USA (1899-1937, based on the sub-
periods of Table 1) 
Category Very high growth in 
output (above 12%) and 
very high growth in 
TFP (around 2%) 
High growth in 
output (above 6%) 
and high growth in 
TFP (around 1.2%) 
Average (or low) 
growth in output 
(about 2%) and 
Average (or low) 
growth in TFP 
(around 0.70%) 
Very high growth 
in output and low 
or average growth 
in TFP or vice-
versa. 
Sectors  Transportation 
 Electrical Machinery 
 Rubber 
 
  
 Paper 
 Chemicals 
 Clay, Glass etc 
 Primary and      
Fabricated Metals 
 Miscellaneous 
 Tobacco 
 Textiles 
 Apparel 
 Wood (lowest) 
 Printing 
 Leather 
 
 Food (high TFP) 
 Furniture (high 
TFP) 
 Petroleum (low 
TFP) 
 Non-Electrical 
Machinery 
(very high 
TFP)  
 
What have been the reasons for the differences between the period 1899-1914 and 1915-1929, and 
for the differences between sectors in terms of OIs? First, during 1915-1929, the expansion took 
place through an expansion in firm size. This can be testified by reference to several factors, such 
as vertical integration, integration of mass production and distribution, and a continuous 
evolutionary technological improvement9 (as opposed to the revolutionary technological 
improvement which took place in the last three decades of the 19th century). Statistical support for 
this expansion through integration can be seen in Table 1, with reference to the ratio of the number 
of employed people per establishment. This ratio increased dramatically during 1915-1929. Note, 
that although these developments (vertical integration and integration of mass production and 
distribution) started at the end of the 19th century and continued during 1899-1914, it was not until 
                                               
9 Both OIs and TIs constitute technological innovations. 
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1915-1929 that these changes spread out into all layers of the economy and not just in the largest 
companies (for the latter, details can be found in Chandler, 1962, 1977, 1990).  
 
Second, the initial steps of rationalization in industrial production, better known as Scientific 
Management or Taylorism, started during 1890 to 1910 and did not really become applicable until 
later during 1915-1929 and beyond, especially with the advent of Fordism in the Transportation 
sector. Tugwell (1927) and, more recently Nyland (1989) in their detailed accounts confirm the 
conclusion that applications of Taylorism10 became increasingly prevalent in the American 
economy during WWI and in the 1920s.  
 
Tugwell (1927, in particular chapter four) provides a detailed account of many industrial cases that 
benefited from various applications of scientific management (such as time-and-motion studies). 
He suggests that productivity increases that took place in American manufacturing between 1914 
and the mid 1920s were due to a large extent to the advent of applications of Taylor’s principles11. 
As can be clearly seen from Tables 1 and 2, the sectors which grew most rapidly both in terms of 
real output and TFP were those for which Scientific Management, Taylorism, and Fordism became 
most applicable, that is mainly the Transportation, Electrical Machinery, Primary and Fabricated 
Metals, and Non-Electrical Machinery sectors (Chandler, 1977; Tugwell, 1927). It is worth noting 
for the Non-Electrical Machinery sector that although its real output did not grow very fast, its 
TFP did, thus confirming that productivity increases were due to OIs (as well as TIs).  Overall, 
Tugwell (1927, p. 126) argued that: 
“…So far as specific cases go, it would appear that scientific management has contributed 
enormously to increased productivity. Judged by the test of measuring material outputs before and 
after the introduction of the system, the cases cited above, and others, show a definite correlation 
between the introduction of the system and increased productivity…” 
 
Third, and as a corollary to the second point, since TFP seems to be so small before 1915, one 
could conclude that almost all growth in real output took place because of corresponding increases 
                                               
10 For example through Fordism, cf. Nyland (1989, p. 141, and generally chapter four). 
11 These principles are extensively analyzed, for instance, in George (1972). 
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in capital, labor and materials. However, OIs during 1880-1914 “allowed” the increases in these 
inputs to take place because they set the right organizational and managerial environment for such 
growth of inputs and output. Specific reference is made here to OIs such as vertical integration, or 
integration of mass consumption and mass distribution, centralization of the management process, 
replacement of owners by salaried managers, as well as the replacement of the domestic system by 
the factory system. Most likely, the domestic system almost completely disappeared by the end of 
the 19th century (Chandler, 1977), but the new system had to still work itself out for another 15 
years before it also contributed to some extent to the sharp increase in TFP.  
 
Figure 1        USA, TFP Manufacturing Sectors, Average Annual % growth, 1899 to 
1937 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on Table 1.  
 
In order to further support the above comments, Figures 1 and 2 summarize the TFP and real 
output annual growth rates for the three sub-periods examined. TFPs and real output did not grow 
in a parallel way in all sectors; for instance, though the petroleum industry’s real output grew by 
about 65% annually from 1914 to 1929, TFP only grew by 0.22% annually during the same period. 
On the contrary, although the electrical industry’s real output grew by about 12% p.a. during 1914-
1929, TFP grew by 2.25% p.a. during the same period. These differences are due to various 
reasons, one of them being differences in OIs and differences in technical innovations (TIs). In the 
above examples, the petroleum industry grew so fast primarily because of capital investment 
(hence a low TFP), whereas the electrical industry had a much higher TFP growth mainly because 
pioneering electrical companies such as GE had set such an internal organization that new 
products were produced in mass by following Tayloristic and Fordist methods. Here particular 
reference is also made to the passage from the functional form of corporate governance to the 
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divisional form of governance. Similar comments apply to other industries such as the 
transportation (Chandler, 1977, 1985, 1990). 
 
Figure 2        USA, Manufacturing Sectors, Real Output, Average Annual % Growth, 
1899-1937 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on Table 1. 
 
The very strong growth of several sectors during the period under consideration can also be 
detected through the number of large firms founded per year during this period. Figure 3 shows the 
founding dates of the largest 500 American companies of 1994 (Harris Corporation, 1996). More 
precisely, Table 3 shows the number of firms founded for selected sub-periods. Thus, it can be 
seen that during 1899-1914 and 1915-1929, the number of companies founded increased 
substantially as a consequence of mainly two factors: OIs such as vertical and horizontal 
integration of firms, and overall economic growth.  
Table 3 Number of the largest 500 American companies founded during sub-
periods between 1851 and 1986 
  
Sub-
period 
1851-
1866 
1867-
1882 
1883-
1898 
1899-
1914 
1915-
1929 
1930-
1944 
1945-
1959 
1960-
1974 
1975-
1986 
Number 
of 
companies 
founded 
40 50 64 87 81 37 38 34 23 
 
All these developments regarding the growth of leading sectors and firms during the period 1899 
to 1929 and the introduction of major OIs such as integration of mass production and mass 
distribution, scientific management, Fordism, all created a process of embeddedness for corporate 
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strategy, governance, and leadership according to Chandler’s (1962) thesis. Other studies are 
needed to determine more precisely this process. 
Figure 3       Founding dates of the largest 500  American companies of 1994 
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2 Japan 
In Japan, there are two main reasons why a detailed analysis similar to that for the USA is not 
possible or is not as important. First, a detailed analysis is not possible because of lack of basic 
data since only 8 manufacturing sectors (see Figure 4) have appropriate records and capital stock is 
not included in them. Second, a detailed analysis is not important because for most of the period 
examined the textiles industry consistently constituted about a third of total manufacturing. Figure 
4 shows the data for real output of these 8 sectors. It is obvious from this graph that the index of 
total production has very closely followed that of textiles. Also it can be seen that in the 1930s the 
sub-sectors of machinery, chemicals and metals have accelerated their growth. To see this picture 
more clearly, two more figures are shown. 
 
Figure 5 shows the 5-year moving average of the sub-sectors textiles, food, forest products, stone, 
and miscellaneous, whereas Figure 6 shows the 5-year moving average of the sub-sectors textiles, 
chemicals, metals, machinery, and miscellaneous. It becomes clearer in these graphs that textiles 
became a strong leading sector in the last 15 years or so of the 19th century. The sub-sector 
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machinery followed its own path both at the beginning of the period examined and from WWI to 
the 1920s. This latter part of the path is primarily explained through the fact that the demand 
generated by the combating nations dissipated after WWI. Another important observation is that 
both the machinery and metals industries grew together and had some exceptional rates of growth 
in some sub-periods such as those at the end of the 19th century and again at the beginning of the 
20th century. 
Figure 4       Japan, Real Output Indexes for 8 industries 
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Figure 5       Japan, Manufacturing sectors, 5-year moving average of growth rates 
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Figure 6     Japan, Manufacturing sectors, 5-year moving average of growth rates 
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In order to see more clearly the periods where there was some important divergence of growth 
rates between sub-sectors, cointegration analysis was used and two cointegrating vectors were 
calculated to detect these periods. Figure 7 shows the results, whereby it becomes obvious that the 
main divergence and structural changes took place firstly in the 1930s and to a lesser extent in the 
period of WWI, the 1920s, and at the turn of the 20th century. 
Figure 7     Japan 8 industries, 1874 to 1940, 2 cointegrating vectors 
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These brief remarks can now be related to OIs in Japan during the examined period. The 
appearance of large conglomerates, the zaibatsu, (Yui and Nakagawa, 1989) at the end of the 19th 
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century created a unique Japanese corporate culture that shaped Japanese economy for more than a 
century. In addition, according to the analysis provided by Fruin (1992), focal factories 
(decentralized, flexible and innovative functional rather small firms) took off, on a big scale, in the 
1930s. Also, during and just after WWI, the Japanese industrial system, and in particular the 
machinery sub-sector was re-organized and many new firms were created, mainly as a response to 
foreign demand.  
 
These OI-related structural shifts coincided with some institutional changes as well, which always 
play a preponderant role in business in Japan. For example, the government in the 1880s initiated 
large scale privatization, or in the 1930s it encouraged industrial growth for military reasons. 
Furthermore, the textiles sector played an overwhelmingly important role for a long period in 
Japan because it continuously reorganized itself to become decentralized and flexible to 
accommodate global changes (Fruin, 1992). Overall, OIs played an important role, especially in 
the leading sectors of textiles initially and those of machinery and metals at a later stage. The 
concurrent combination of the zaibatsu conglomerates, a proliferation of rather small focal 
factories, the strong intervention of governmental policies, and the existence of leading sectors, all 
created a process of embeddedness for corporate strategy, governance, and leadership according to 
Chandler’s (1962) thesis. Other studies are needed to determine more precisely this process. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper computations of TFP and real output growth during 1899-1914 and 1915-1929 in the 
USA has revealed which sectors led the American economy during these periods. The appearance 
of major OIs at the same time as the existence of leading sectors created a process of 
embeddedness for corporate strategy, governance and leadership. A parallel exploration of 
Japanese leading sectors and OIs also created a similar process of embeddedness in Japan. Only a 
brief description of this three-layer relationship between leading sectors, OIs and the concept of 
embeddedness is presented in this paper. More evidence is needed to confirm the relevant 
conclusions. 
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